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Abstract
In a recent paper on Cortical Dynamics, Francis and Grossberg raise the
question how visual forms and motion information are integrated to generate
a coherent percept of moving forms? In their investigation of illusory contours
(which are, like Kanizsa squares, mental constructs rather than stimuli on the
retina) they quantify the subjective impression of apparent motion between
illusory contours that are formed by two subsequent stimuli with delay times
of about 0.2 second (called the interstimulus interval ISI). The impression of
apparent motion is due to a back referral of a later experience to an earlier time
in the conscious representation.
A model is developed which describes the state of awareness in the observer
in terms of a time dependent Schroedinger equation to which a second order
time derivative is added. This addition requires as boundary conditions the
values of the solution both at the beginning and after the process. Satisfac-
tory quantitative agreement is found between the results of the model and the
experimental results.
We recall that in the von Neumann interpretation of the collapse of the quan-
tum mechanical wave-function, the collapse was associated with an observer’s
awareness. Some questions of causality and determinism that arise from later-
time boundary conditions are touched upon.
1 Experimental Background
We consider phenomena in cognitive psychology variously known as ”apparent move-
ment” [1], temporal ”binding” ([2], [3]),”filling in” [4] or ”coherence” [5].
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It was noted several years ago that when a bright spot on a screen was followed
(after an interval of up to half a second) by another spot some distance away, the
viewer perceived the spots as though performing a continuous motion [6]. The time
delay involved is much longer than the characteristic delay or inertial time (tens of
milliseconds) in cortical neural cells and it is regarded as due to the time needed
for conscious processing. Moreover, having perceived the second spot, the viewer
does not ”date” the motion to the instant of her seeing this, but to the instant
of observation of the first spot. In the words of an authoritative source [7] [with
added context-setting by us]: ”... there is a subjective referral of timing [8], i.e. the
brain compensates for [the] preconscious processing [what happens before t = 0] by
”marking” the time of arrival of stimuli at the cortical surfaces [at t = 0] with an
evoked potential and then referring experienced time of occurrence [t = T ] back to
time of arrival of stimuli [t = 0]. Therefore experienced [!] time of arrival is actual
time of arrival [t = 0], rather than the time when a conscious representation has had
time to develop.”
It is reasonable to assume that a quantification of awareness variables
(the ”qualia”) is feasible and access to them exists through psychological and neu-
robiological inquiries ([9], Section 4.3). Arguments have also been made for the
existence of awareness units, analogous to atoms in matter. [10] Estimates of the
speeds of mental processes, e.g. decision times (0.06 − 0.17 s) have been obtained
in the classic studies of Donders [11]. These are distinct from the times needed for
”neural conditions to develop that are adequate to support conscious experience” [7]
and presumably relate to processes in upper layers of the cortex.
2 Wave-function formalism
We describe cognitive processes in terms of brain (r) and awareness (A) variables
and assume that their combined state Ψ(r,A; t) (t is time) is subject to the formal-
ism of wave mechanics. This hinges on a Hamiltonian H(r,A; t) which prescribes
the evolution of the state of cognition. Since, however, Schroedinger equation is
completely causal (in the sense that its solution evolves in time in a unique manner),
whereas mental processes are (by our understanding) non-deterministic, we write
the following equation for Ψ(r,A; t).
−W
∂2Ψ
∂t2
+ ih
∂Ψ
∂t
= HΨ. (1)
Since this is a second order differential equation in time, its solutions are fixed
by boundary conditions imposed on Ψ both at the beginning and at the end of the
cognitive process. This type of boundary conditions is appropriate for the description
of human choices and decisions (which are felt to be non-predestinated) and for the
collapse of wave packets in the course of a quantum mechanical measurement (whose
outcomes are also not predetermined). [We note that the original form of the non-
relativistic limit of the Dirac equation also has a second order time-derivative, rather
than only the first order derivative, as in the Schroedinger equation.[12]] In simple
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terms this means that in order to describe certain mental processes one has to know
(in addition to the ”mechanism”, expressed by the Hamiltonian) the final as well as
the initial state. The probability (or frequency) of a final state actually occurring is
given by Born’s propensity rules.[Exactly as in quantum mechanics ( Probability ∝
weight of final state in the initial state).]
3 Awareness state
For constant H one can solve equation (1) in the domain (called ”Domain II”)
between t− 0 and T , with boundary conditions imposed at the edges of the domain.
For HW
h¯
2 ≫ 1 [which is appropriate for brain sizes having macroscopic (not atomic)
dimensions] one obtains solutions of the type:
Ψ = a exp t
√
H
W
+ b exp−t
√
H
W
. (2)
The norm of this state function is time dependent and has a minimum at the midpoint
of the domain (at t = T/2) of about
|Ψ|2min = exp−T
√
H
W
. (3)
Because of the conservation of all matter in the brain, the natural interpretation
of this result is that awareness is not conserved but dips inside domain II. To
test this in a specific, but still hypothetic way we turn to observation of apparent
motion between illusory contours [13]. This phenomenon was recently quantitatively
investigated by Francis and Grossberg [1], who obtained the percentage of positive
responses from two subjects (GM and PG) as function of stimulus duration D (in the
range 0.04− 0.64 s) and of the interstimulus interval (ISI) in the same range (Their
figure 1(a)). We identify the perception of motion with the arousal of awareness
and the ISI with our parameter T . We further suppose that there is a threshold
of awareness intensity given by some value of the state function squared l0 = |Ψ0|
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below which the apparent motion will not be perceived (i.e. the subject will say he
has not seen any motion). For simplicity we shall make a further assumption (similar
to the ergodic hypothesis); namely, that the fraction of times that the subject will
give a positive answer will be equal to that fraction of time length within domain II
during which the state function intensity exceeds the threshold; or to the fraction of
time that
|Ψ(t)|2 > l0. (4)
Approximating |Ψ(t)|2 in the region 0 < t < T
2
by a simple exponential:
exp−2v+t (5)
and in the region T
2
< t < T by its mirror image (so that |Ψ|2 is unity at t = 0 and
T ), we obtain for the fraction of time f(T ) that equation (4) is satisfied:
f(T ) =
log 1
l0
v+T
if
log 1
l0
v+T
≤ 1.
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Subject D Value 0.85 0.7 0.55 Average s.d.
GM 160 ISI 196 251 310
ISI × Prob. 167 176 171 171 4.5
GM 320 ISI 209 282 361
ISI × Prob. 178 197 199 191 11.6
GM 640 ISI 187 238.5 293
ISI × Prob. 159 167 161 162 4.2
PG 160 ISI 377 490 624
ISI × Prob. 320 343 343 335 13.3
PG 320 ISI 343 422 505
ISI × Prob. 291 295 278 288 8.9
PG 640 ISI 175 258 353
ISI × Prob. 149 181 194 175 23.2
Table 1: Values of Interstimulus Intervals (milliseconds) at which subjects GM and
PG perceived motion with shown probabilities (relative frequencies) at given values
of stimulus duration (D, in ms). From Francis and Grossberg [1]. Adjacent rows
show the computed products ISI × Probabilities and their averages for each row
and the standard deviations (s.d.). The theory states that ISI×Prob. is a constant
in each row.
f(T ) = 1 if
log 1
l0
v+T
> 1. (6)
We wish to test this f(T ) vs. T against the probability vs. ISI values of Francis and
Grossberg [1]. Neither l0 nor v+ are known and indeed may vary with subject and
D (stimulus duration), but we see from equation (6) that for a given subject and D
f(T )T is independent of T or of f(T ).
The following table (Table 1)exhibits the values for
ISI × Probability (7)
at three equi-spaced values of logD and for both subjects, taken from the contour
plot of Francis and Grossberg [1]. The constancy of the product in 7 is indeed
apparent. To better appreciate this, we show the averages and the standard deviation
(s.d.) of the product of each case. The s.d. are much smaller (11 is the mean s.d.)
than the deviation between the averages (the maximum deviation of averages in
Table 1 is 170 and the root mean square of the differences between the 6 averages is
106).
4 Conclusion
This work has started out with a simple idea that intended to fill in a gap in the
conventional formulation of QuantumMechanics, namely to describe the reduction of
the wave-packet as a continuous time-varying process. The second order differential
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equation (1) , together with its boundary conditions, does this. Questions arising
from it (e.g., nonunitarity of development, causality) are not harder than those
for previous works,e.g. the two-time formalism of Aharonov and co-authors. An
interpretation of the awareness state function has been discussed in section 3.
In the awareness interpretation, the collapse is an expression of the mind-brain
interaction and the collapse-equation proposed in this work is a formalization of this
interaction. When we extend the reign of the equation to cognitive processes in
general, we find novel implications in the following fields: The psychological phe-
nomenon of back referral (see section 3), the quantification of conscious activity in
small species , the process of mental decisions and the issue of free will .
As the a next step, one needs to devise some critical experiments whereby the
theory can be tested.
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